Buffalo Law Review
Volume 8

Number 1

Article 107

10-1-1958

Property—Tax Sale—Statute of Limitations for Setting Aside
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Buffalo Law Review, Property—Tax Sale—Statute of Limitations for Setting Aside, 8 Buff. L. Rev. 172
(1958).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol8/iss1/107

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It is well settled that where the covenant of quiet enjoyment is expressly
conditioned upon the tenant's payment of rent and his performance of the obligations of the lease, his failure to pay such rent or perform such obligations is a bar
to the maintenance of any action upon the covenant for interference with the
quiet enjoyment of the premises, this is true whether the tenant's claim of a breach
of the covenant is based on an actual 21 or a constructive eviction. 22 The Court
also pointed out that section 234 of the Real Property Law 23 was not only not
retroactive,24 but also that the plain m.2aning of the statute does not suggest that
the covenant of quiet enjoyment may not be conditioned upon the performance
by the tenant of his covenants in the lease.
Tax Sale-Statute of Limitations for Seffing Aside
The statute of limitations for tax deed conveyances is presently but temporarily found in Tax Law sections 131 and 13225 They provide in pertinent part
that after two years from the date of the record of a tax sale conveyance, the
presumption of regularity of the sale and all proceedings prior thereto shall
become conclusive. Section 132 further provides all such conveyances and proceedings shall be subject to cancellation within five years from the last date of
redemption by reason of three situational defects, one of which is any defect in
the proceedings affecting the jurisdiction upon constitutional grounds.
In Kiamesha Dev. Corp. v. Guild Properties, Inc.,26 the plaintiff owner
brought this action to cancel a tax deed conveyance to the defendant purchaser,
by reason of a jurisdictional defect, two years after the deed recording but before
five years from the last date of redemption. The Appellate Division decided that
the two year provision of these statutes barred the instant action even if the
defects shown here were jurisdictional. The court relied on a statement in Werking
v. Amity Estates,27 which was construed as meaning that jurisdictional defects as
well as mere irregularities were bound by the two year period. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that their statement in Werking was misinterpreted and
so construed would completely nullify the intention of section 132 which explicitly
allows for cancellation within five years by reason of jurisdictional defects.
21. Silken v. Farrel, 306 N.Y. 585, 115 N.E. 827 (1953).
22. Baitzel v. Rhinelander, 179 App.Div. 735, 167 N.Y. Supp. 343 (1st Dep't
1917); Meyer v. Schulte, 160 App.Div. 236, 144 N.Y. Supp. 1023 (1st Dep't 1913).
23. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §234 provides:
Every covenant, agreement . . . exempting the lessor from

liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused

by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor

deemed to be void as against public policy.

.'..

shall be

24. Weiler v. Dry Dock Say. Inst., 284 N.Y. 630, 29 N.E.2d 938 (1940).
25. N. Y. TAX LAw §§131 and 132 have been repealed. Now see §§1018 and
1020 of the REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, effective October 1, 1959.
26. 4 N.Y.2d 378, 175 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1958).
27. 2 N.Y.2d 43, 155 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
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Another problem presented was the standard to be applied in determining
when property is unidentifiably described so as to constitute a jurisdictional
defect. The test has been set out as
[wjhether the description is sufficiently definite to enable the owner
and all persons interested to know and ascertain, by inquiry at the appropriate office or examination of the assessment rolls, what premises
are assessed, and to identify them with reasonable certainty, so that it
may fairly be said that a particular tract or parcel of land is the parcel
and to which the purchaser on the tax sale is entitled
or tract assessed,
28
to possession.
In the present case the property had had the same tax description and the tax had
been paid on that description for many years. The plaintiff had employed a tax
searcher who located the property, but erroneously did not discover the 1942
tax unpaid. The Court took into consideration the special knowledge of persons
who had been able to locate or identify the property, the abstract adequacy of
geographical description for due process, and, because of the nature of tax sales,
the reluctance of the courts to divest the owner's title unless the statutory require-,
ments are strictly observed.
The owner had also argued that the purported tax deed was void because the
tax certificate was made out to a non-existent corporation which came into existence only a matter of days later. The Court agreed, holding as an alternative
ground to the main rationale of the case, that there was no grantee in existence
to whom the tax certificate could run. On the analysis of the evidence, the Court
rejected the claim of the defendant that the corporation was do facto in existence
at the time the deed was delivered. 2 9
Indian Lands-Claim for Misappropriation Dismissed on Showing of Release
When the New York State Power Authority appropriated Barnhart's Island
in the St. Lawrence River, the St. Regis Tribe of Indians brought an action for
compensation for their rights in the island. The Indians claimed they had a
recognized title in the island; that they had never been compensated for its extinguishment; that an 1856 payment allegedly made for such compensation could not
be so considered for it was not in compliance with the Indian Intercourse Act
of 1802.80
28. People v. Sohmers, 150 App.Div. 8, 134 N.Y. Supp. 543 (3d Dep't 1912),

aff'd 206 N.Y. 39, 99 N.E. 156 (1912); Shea v. Campbell, 71 Misc. 230, 128 N.Y.

Supp. 508 (Sup.Ct. 1911).
29. Kiamesha Dev. Corp. v. Guild Properties, 4 N.Y. 2d 378, 338, 175 N.Y.S. 2d
63, 70 (1958).
30. 25 U.S.C. §177. The applicable provision of this statute provides that
dealings in respect to Indian lands must be had with the consent and approbation
of United States Commissioners appointed to supervise the negotiations.

